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Introduction
In contrast to reward-based decision-making, the underlying 
structure of aversive decision-making is less well understood. 
This is especially true in the case of avoidance learning, in which 
decisions are made that lead to the reduction, delay or omission 
of an otherwise expected punishment. The control of acquisition 
and expression of avoidance has been the topic of debate for dec-
ades, not least because of the difficulty of any single model to 
account for the range of experimental findings (Dinsmoor, 2001; 
Gillan et al., 2016).
In instrumental (‘operant’) reward learning, there is widely 
thought to be two distinct systems that interact to guide behaviour: 
a cognitive ‘model-based’ system which incorporates explicit 
knowledge of the structure of the reward environment (the contin-
gencies between states, actions and their outcomes) and a computa-
tionally simpler ‘model-free’ system which simply learns the value 
of actions given different states, emitting habit-like responses 
(Dayan and Balleine, 2002; Dickinson, 1985; Dolan and Dayan, 
2013). How these two systems interact and cooperate has been the 
focus of recent theoretical and experimental studies, and evidence 
suggests the existence of a competitive process by which the cogni-
tive ‘model-based’ system exerts control when the outcomes of 
decisions are more uncertain, but that the ‘model-free’ habit system 
assumes control when outcomes become more predictable and it is 
safe to rely on a computationally less expensive system to guide 
behaviour (Daw et al., 2005). In a recent study, Lee and colleagues 
described behavioural and neural evidence that the balance of con-
trol between the two controllers was mediated by a flexible 
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‘arbitration’ mechanism based on the relative reliabilities of each 
system, estimated from prediction errors (Lee et al., 2014).
In the case of avoidance, evidence of two systems underly-
ing control is somewhat less clear-cut. For instance, instruction 
alone is sufficient to acquire avoidance behaviour, and exces-
sive avoidance training can lead to a resistance to extinction of 
avoidance when aversive events are no longer possible (Gillan 
et al., 2014). However, there have been few clear demonstra-
tions that two distinct systems operate in parallel during avoid-
ance, and it is not known whether they are subject to the higher 
control of an arbitrator similar to that of rewards. If it is, this 
would help resolve previous debate about the sufficiency of any 
one system to control avoidance in multiple situations, and pro-
vide important insight into disorders such as obsessive compul-
sive disorder (OCD), which are thought to result from excessive 
habitisation of avoidance behaviour (Robbins et al., 2012).
We implemented a decision-making task to probe the balance of 
control between two putative systems of avoidance learning, mirror-
ing a task paradigm and modelling approach recently developed for 
a financial reward task (Lee et al., 2014). Subjects performed a two-
step instrumental avoidance paradigm in which an initial two-option 
decision could lead to one of four intermediate states (represented by 
visual images), and with a second two-option choice leading to an 
outcome state represented by a coloured visual image with an asso-
ciated number of painful electrical stimuli (Figure 1(a)).
Before the experimental task, subjects performed a training ses-
sion to learn about the states and their transitions, and hence the 
corresponding pain outcomes associated with different decision 
sequences. In the experimental task, subjects were required to try 
to avoid pain in two ‘goal conditions’. In a specific-goal condition, 
the outcomes were contingent on a rule: if the colour of the image 
that represented the outcome state matched that specified at the 
beginning of the trial, then the outcome state was delivered; if it 
did not match, the maximum pain was delivered. In a flexible-goal 
condition, the outcome state was delivered regardless of any rule 
relating to the colour of its representative image. The specific-goal 
condition requires cognitive representations (model) of pain out-
comes and state transition probabilities (i.e. integrating the rule 
with explicit knowledge of the outcomes), whereas the flexible-
goal condition can be solved by simple reinforcement of state-
action sequences (habits). Following Lee et al. (2014), we proposed 
an arbitration model of avoidance learning in which two systems 
operate, with their contribution to a choice balanced by a reliabil-
ity-based arbitration mechanism.
Methods
Subjects
A total of 15 subjects (2 females) participated in the study. All 
subjects were screened for a history of psychiatric or neurologi-
cal problems, and were free of pain or pain medication. The sub-
jects gave written informed consent before the experiment and 
the study was approved by the ethics committee of Advanced 
Telecommunications Research Institute International.
Pain stimuli and calibration
The pain stimulus was delivered as a sequence of five square 
pulses of electric current (on for 2 ms and off for 8 ms) delivered 
by isolated bipolar constant current stimulator (DS7, Digitimer 
Figure 1. Two-step decision-making task. (a) Tree-shaped state mapping structure and an example state transition of a trial resulting from first 
choice (R: right) and second choice (R), and resulting in obtaining the 0 red coin. If the trial was in the flexible-goal condition, the subject would 
have received 0 shocks. If the trial was a specific-goal condition with a red collection box, the subject would also receive 0 shocks, but if the box 
was one of the other colours (blue or yellow), the subject would have received a default of 4 shocks. (b) Time sequence of a trial in the specific-
goal condition. The initial, intermediate and outcome states are represented as a fractal image. With the decision states, the current goal is shown 
as a coloured box (e.g. yellow). After two consecutive choices, an outcome state is displayed with electrical shocks delivered on the back of the 
subject’s non-dominant hand. (c) Diagram of the computational model with arbitration between model-based and model-free learning systems.
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Ltd.) to a non-magnetic 5-mm diameter bipolar concentric elec-
trode (Unique medical Co. Ltd) placed on the subject’s non-dom-
inant hand (fascia over adductor pollicis muscle).
Before the experiment, subjects underwent a thresholding 
procedure to control for individual difference in skin resistance 
and pain tolerance. We administered the electric stimuli with 
gradual increases from 4 mA, and subjects provided visual ana-
logue ratings of each shock on a scale from 0 (not painful) to 10 
(intolerable pain). When subjects reported the strongest pain that 
they could tolerate, no higher stimulation was delivered. The 
level of shock delivered in the experiment was set to a stimulus 
strength of scale 5 (moderate pain) for each individual. Then the 
subjects were asked to rate 1, 2 and 4 sequential shocks, which 
are used as outcomes in the experimental task, to ensure they 
were ready and comfortable with the strength of stimulus. The 
average shock strength was 32.07 mA (standard deviation 
(SD) = 9.60).
Experimental task
Subjects performed a two-choice decision-making task, in which 
they were required to make two sequential choices (by pressing 
‘LEFT’ or ‘RIGHT’ button) to avoid a number of shocks at the 
outcome stage (after the second choice; Figure 1(a)). All possible 
states, one initial choice state, four intermediate choice states and 
four outcome states, were represented as different fractal images 
(Figure 1(a)). The outcome states were displayed on a coloured 
coin (red, yellow, blue and grey) with a numerical amount (0, 1, 
2 or 4) that indicated the number of painful shock stimuli that 
subjects received as the outcome. In each trial, subjects began at 
the same initial state. Making no choice at either choice state 
within 4 s resulted in the computer making a random choice to 
proceed, and that trial was marked as a penalising trial and 
removed from the analysis. The inter-states and inter-trial inter-
vals were sampled from a uniform distribution between 1 and 4 s. 
The shocks given at the end of a trial lasted 0.5 s and were admin-
istered with 0.4 s between subsequent shocks, followed by a 2-s 
delay with the state still on display.
Our experimental design involved performing the task in two 
different condition blocks: a ‘flexible-goal’ condition and a ‘spe-
cific-goal’ condition, with the conditions randomised between 
blocks. In both the conditions, a ‘collection box’ was displayed at 
each choice stage. In the specific-goal condition, the collection box 
had a specific colour (either red, yellow or blue, but not grey) and 
indicated the ‘goal’ on that trial (Figure 1(b)). In this condition, 
only the coin with the same colour as the collection box maintained 
its value, and the other coins were set the default maximum value 
of 4 shocks. That is, if the specific coloured coin was acquired, 
subjects receive the number of shocks associated with that coin, 
otherwise, they got 4 shocks regardless of the value stated on the 
acquired coin. During the specific-goal condition block, the goal 
(colour of collection box) was changed randomly from trial-to-
trial. Thus, to avoid the maximum shocks, subjects had to continu-
ally consider which goal had avoidance value and plan their 
choices to acquire that goal, based on their learned knowledge of 
the action-outcome transitions. Note that the colour of the 4-shock 
coin was grey and this colour was never presented as the collection 
box (since this would result in 4 shocks regardless of choice). The 
specific-goal condition was thus designed to favour the model-
based over the model-free control.
In the flexible-goal condition, a white collection box was pre-
sented, and subjects knew that all outcome coins retained their 
values, that is, in effect, the colour of the coins indicating the 
outcome value was irrelevant. In this condition, the best outcome 
is always the coins with no shocks (which happened to be the red 
coins) and there is no need to change their strategy on a trial-by-
trial basis, and so in the situation, subjects can simply choose the 
best state-action contingencies and thus the model-free system 
should be dominant.
To further aid dissociation of model-based from the model-
free control and to prevent subjects from using multiple model-
free strategies in the absence of the model-based control in the 
specific-goal condition, two levels of uncertainty condition were 
used. In a low uncertainty condition the state transition probabili-
ties to two consecutive states were 0.9 and 0.1, and in a high 
uncertainty condition the state transition probabilities were 0.5 
and 0.5. Thus overall, there were four task conditions comprising 
two factors: specific- or flexible-goal and low or high uncertainty 
condition, and the order of four condition blocks was randomised. 
The blocks with low uncertainty consisted of three to five trials, 
whereas the high uncertainty blocks consisted of five to seven tri-
als due to their difficulty. During each trial, subjects could recog-
nise the goal condition but they were not explicitly told the state 
transition probabilities, so they did not know at the beginning of 
each block whether they were in the high or low uncertainty con-
dition. The changes in the transition probabilities are rapid and are 
designed to induce perturbations in the predictions about state-
transition probabilities, which in turn affected changes in the allo-
cation of model-based and model-free control.
At the beginning of experiment, subjects performed a training 
session to learn about the states and corresponding pain outcomes. 
Importantly, however, subjects were not informed of the specific 
state transition probabilities used in the task; instead, they were 
told that the contingencies might change during the course of the 
experiment and that outcomes were not random. The state transi-
tion probability was fixed at 0.5 (high uncertainty) for all choice 
states and a white collection box was presented, indicating that 
any coin colour would lead to the indicated number of shocks 
(flexible-goal) though no shock stimulus was provided during 
training. The subjects performed 100 trials in the training session 
followed by two experimental sessions, each of which consists of 
12 blocks of four task conditions, 48 blocks in total.
Computational model
We applied the computational model proposed by Lee et al. 
(2014) to account for arbitration of two learning systems (Figure 
1(c)). Accordingly, model-free and model-based learning sys-
tems jointly determine the final state-action value based on the 
reliabilities calculated from their recent prediction errors.
For the model-free learning system, a model-free SARSA, a 
variant of a classical reinforcement learning model (Sutton and 
Barto, 1998) was used. The model-free state-action value 
Q s aMF ( , )  defined in terms of the expected future outcome 
(reward or pain) from the current state s  and action a . The 
value is updated by outcome prediction error (OPE), a temporal 
difference of actual outcome (r) and predicted immediate out-
come at current state (difference in values of current state and 
action, Q s aMF ( , ) , and next state and action, Q s aMF ( , ’)’ ), to 
decrease the inconsistencies
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The model-based system learns both state transition probabili-
ties and state-action value independently, but concurrently (Gläscher 
et al., 2010). This model constructs a FORWARD internal model of 
the state-transition matrix as T s a s( , , ’)  of state transition probabili-
ties, which represents the probability of the agent arriving at state 
s ’ if it made an action a  in state s . When the agent made an 
action and observed the next state, the state transition is updated by 
the state prediction error (SPE), which is computed as a difference 
in the actual state transition and the estimated probability. With a 
given outcome r , the state-action value Q s aMB ( , )  is updated 
based on a dynamic programming method, that is, calculated as the 
product of the state-transition probabilities and the value (the sum 
of a given outcome and expected value of next state Q s aMB ( ’, ’) )
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The learning rate of both model-free and model-based state-
action value, α, is a free parameter and estimated from subjects’ 
actual behaviour. Here, we use a single learning rate for the 
model-free and the model-based as with Lee et al’.s reward-
based learning task, because the two models’ performance differ-
ence is stable for a given learning rate that guarantees 
convergence. In addition, the model-based learning system in 
equipped with BACKWARD planning when the explicit goal 
condition is changed. In the specific-goal condition, this back-
ward planning allows the system to devalue the outcome states 
(coins) whose colours are not the same as the ‘goal’ and also 
update the state-action values based on that.
The reliabilities of the two models are evaluated from the pre-
diction errors, OPE and SPE, using a simple hierarchical empiri-
cal Bayes approach so that the larger prediction error decreases 
the reliability of the learning system. For the model-free system, 
the estimator Ω learns to predict the absolute OPE as
∆Ω Ω= −( )η OPE
where η  denotes a learning rate parameter for updating the esti-
mation. If the estimator predicts zero OPE, the reliability of 
model-free system reaches the maximum. For the model-based 
system, on the other hand, if the SPE was less than a threshold 
parameter ω , the system counts the error was zero and the reli-
ability reaches the maximum. To govern how two systems com-
pete, a dynamical two-state transition model in which the states 
are the probabilities for choosing each system’s strategy, pMF  
and pMB  (where p pMF MB= −1 ), was used. The transition rates 
between two states, τMF  and τMB , were a logit function, and 
modulated by the reliabilities. As the habits tend to emerge with 
increased training (Gläscher et al., 2010), there was a fixed bias 
to favour the model-free control if the reliabilities are equal.
Finally, the arbitration model calculates weighted state-action 
value of two systems and selects actions stochastically according 
to a soft-max function with an inverse temperature parameter β  
as (Gläscher et al., 2010; Luce, 1959)
Q p Q p Q
P s a
Q
Q
MB MB MF MF= +
=
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Statistical analysis
Our model’s free parameters were fitted to the behavioural data 
by minimising the negative log-likelihood ( −∑ log ( , )P s a ) 
given the observed choices and rewards, summed across all sub-
jects and trials. We used the Nelder–Mead simplex algorithm for 
optimisation (the function ‘fminsearch’ in MATLAB). To mini-
mise the risk of local optima, we ran this optimisation 100 times 
with random seed parameters in the Linux-based high-perfor-
mance computing (HPC) cluster environment. The implementa-
tion of the computational model of arbitration and all the 
statistical analyses were done with MATLAB 2014b.
Statistical comparisons between behavioural performances 
and parameter estimates were achieved with paired (compare 
between conditions) or two-sample (compare between subject 
groups) t-tests, implemented using the MATLAB Statistics and 
Machine Learning Toolbox.
Results
Figure 2(a) shows the avoidance performance of four task condi-
tions, compared with the reward-based performance in Lee et al. 
(2014). The left panel shows the average number of shocks 
avoided on each trial, in relation to the comparable performance 
for reward in the previous study. Note that as the previous study 
used 10, 20, 30 and 40 cents for the monetary reward, here we 
show the reward values divided by 10 to compare the scale. The 
middle bar graph shows the success rate, defined as the propor-
tion of trials avoiding pain, again compared with that of acquir-
ing reward in previous reward-based task. The right panel 
illustrates the frequency of optimal choices, defined by the ideal 
agent’s behaviour in each condition. The baseline performance 
given by a random choice agent illustrates the fact that perfor-
mance was inherently easier (i.e. could avoid more shocks) in the 
flexible-goal condition and in the low uncertainty condition. 
Overall, these results indicate that the subjects performed well 
across conditions, with clear sensitivity to goal condition and 
uncertainty. This suggests that pain avoidance learning shows a 
basic similarity in observed performance, with respect to sensi-
tivity to condition and uncertainty, as reward learning.
However, one notable difference is apparent. In comparison 
with behaviour in the reward-based learning task, the optimal 
choice rate in the flexible-goal condition under high uncertainty 
was significantly lower in the pain-based learning task (Figure 
2(a) right panel, t-test with unequal variance; t = 5.335, 
p = 6.16e−06), and successful avoidance rate was even marginally 
lower than baseline performance. In the flexible-goal condition, 
the optimal choice on the initial choice state was typically the 
same, that is, choosing Right, for both low and high uncertainty 
conditions, and the subjects performed equally well (Figure 2(b) 
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right bars). But on the subsequent intermediate (second) choice 
state, the optimal choice in low and high uncertainty condition 
was different, that is, choosing Right and Left, respectively, and 
it was at this point where subjects make significantly more errors 
for pain compared to reward (Figure 2(b) left bars, paired t-test 
with equal variance; t = 9.777, p = 1.23e−07). Indeed, the frequency 
of optimal choices was significantly less than chance perfor-
mance (t = 12.427, p = 5.97e−09).
To get more insight into the underlying decision-making 
architecture to account for the behaviour, we next applied a com-
putational modelling approach to fit the choices to model-free 
and model-based decision-making algorithms. The more the 
arbitrator favours the model-based learning strategy, the less con-
sistent subjects’ choices become. To provide a statistical measure 
of the model-based influence on choice, we used a likelihood-
ratio test (Figure 3(a)) in which we separately fit the model-based 
and model-free algorithms to behaviour to prevent circularity and 
computed the log-likelihood value of the model-based minus 
model-free system. The more negative the ratio, the more the 
model-free system accounts better for behaviour, while the more 
positive the ratio the more the model-based system accounts bet-
ter for behaviour. This analysis revealed that choice behaviour is 
better explained by the model-free learner in the flexible-goal 
condition when the arbitrator predicts that behaviour should be 
under model-free control (Figure 3(a) left bar, likelihood-ratio 
test; p < 10−3), while the choice behaviour is better explained by 
the model-based learner in the specific-goal condition when the 
arbitrator predicts that behaviour should be predominantly under 
model-based control (Figure 3(a) right bar, likelihood-ratio test; 
p < 10−8). These findings thereby validate the task manipulations 
by showing that the task can successfully manipulate control to 
be governed predominantly by either the model-based or model-
free system.
Next, we compared the model parameters with those from 
Lee et al.’s otherwise identically structured task for rewards 
(Figure 3(b)). There are six parameters: (1) a threshold parameter 
for model-based reliability, (2) a learning rate for the estimate of 
absolute OPE for Bayesian update of model-free reliability, (3, 4) 
transition rates from model-free and model-based system and 
vice versa which control the competition on reliability-based 
dynamical transition system, (5) inverse soft-max temperature 
for action selection and (6) a learning rate for both learning sys-
tems. We found that the only parameter that differed between 
pain- and reward-based tasks was the learning rate for updating 
the prediction error estimator (Figure 3(b), t-test with unequal 
variance; p = 0.009), which controls how quickly the estimator 
updates the model-free reliability (note that the conventional 
value learning rate did not differ). The greater rate for punish-
ment means that reliability is more dynamic (is more sensitive to 
short-term changes in outcome predictions) and so this will yield 
more dynamism in the transition between model-free and model-
based systems.
Discussion
The results yield three basic conclusions. First, they provide evi-
dence that avoidance learning can be under the control of two 
different systems – a cognitive ‘model-based’ system and a 
‘model-free’ habit system. Second, they suggest that the balance 
of each is under the control of a reliability-based arbitration 
mechanism. And third, they demonstrate a significant difference 
between reward- and punishment-based learning, in that there is 
greater dynamism in the transfer of control between model-based 
and model-free systems in avoidance.
The results provide insight into the nature of avoidance learn-
ing by formalising the concept of separable value systems 
Figure 2. (a) Performance of the subjects in the form of the average number of shocks avoided, the successful rate of shock avoidance, and the 
proportion of optimal choices in the specific-goal (left bars) and the flexible-goal conditions (right bars). The dark and light grey colours correspond 
to the low and high uncertainty conditions, respectively. The red lines refer to the corresponding values of the reward-based task by Lee et al. The 
green lines define the baseline given by a random choice agent and illustrate the fact that avoiding shocks in the flexible-goal condition is easier 
than the specific-goal condition. Error bars are SEM across subjects. (b) In the flexible-goal condition, the proportion of optimal choices at initial 
state was not different between for both low and high uncertainty conditions, while they are different at the successive intermediate choice state. 
Error bars are SEM.
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governing behaviour. There has been a growing recognition that 
any comprehensive account of avoidance needs to accommodate 
both associative accounts (two-factor theory and safety-state 
reinforcement (Dinsmoor, 2001; Mowrer, 1947)) and cognitive 
accounts (for free-operant avoidance (Mineka, 1979)). The latter 
invoked more sophisticated internal representations of the struc-
ture of avoidance, incorporating the capacity to generate expec-
tancies (Gillan et al., 2016; Seligman and Johnston, 1973). The 
results formally support a two-system account of avoidance, with 
the two systems reflecting the core difference between model-
free and model-based learning: since the model-free lacks any 
way of incorporating the re-evaluation of outcome states given 
the outcome rule, it remains purely by the learned values of the 
cues at the decision points, that is, it cannot ‘see ahead’. Although 
there are slightly different computational ways of implementing 
a model-free system, all share this fundamental restriction. 
Similarly, the model-based learning systems should in principle 
encompass a broad array of environmental models, causal mod-
els and models over multiple timescales. Critically, they have the 
ability to re-evaluate their decisions based on rule-based infor-
mation, and this allows them to behave optimally when prospec-
tive outcome states are revalued.
The results also suggest a flexible arbitration system in which 
the relative contribution of model-free and model-based 
controllers reflects an adaptive transition over a number of trials. 
The close similarity of the parameter estimates of the data in this 
study and our previous reward learning study raises an addi-
tional point of debate on the nature of avoidance learning – 
whether the underlying control architecture is the same or 
different. Whereas the nature of the reinforced outcome may be 
fundamentally different in avoidance (an excitatory reward state 
in appetitive reinforcement, and an inhibitory safety state in 
avoidance), this does not necessarily mean the control system 
that learns and emits the appropriate actions is different. Plenty 
of neural data show a common neuroanatomy of reward and 
avoidance actions (Kim et al., 2006; Park et al., 2011; Seymour 
et al., 2012; Talmi et al., 2009), but such data are purely correla-
tive. Evidence from rodents suggests differences in the neural 
mechanisms of reward- and safety state-driven action reinforce-
ment (Fernando et al., 2013); however, it is possible that this 
difference concerns the representation of the outcome state – 
pain relief versus reward, and not necessarily the control archi-
tecture that exploits it. A further uncertainty in this debate relates 
to whether there is any specific excitatory representation of an 
aversive action-outcome value for the avoided action (i.e. 
whether or not only reward-orientated action learning system is 
required, with aversive influences being purely Pavlovian, given 
the sophisticated array of Pavlovian aversive responses that 
Figure 3. (a) Results from a log likelihood test comparing the degree to which model-based versus model-free reinforcement learning accounts best 
for subjects’ choices. Test statistics refer to log likelihood value of the model-based minus the model-free. When the arbitrator favours model-free 
control (left, PMB < 0.5), the ratio was negative (p < 10−3), that is, the model-free system accounts better for behaviour. On the other hand, the ratio 
was positive for the situations in which model-based control was dominant (right, PMB > 0.5) indicates that the model-based system was favoured 
(p < 10−8). Error bars are SEM. (Note: same analysis as Lee’s Figure 3(d).) (b) Comparison of model parameters between our pain-based learning task 
(left bars) and the identical reward-based task by Lee et al. (right bars). The figure shows six model parameters; the threshold for defining zero-
state prediction error (for model-based reliability), the learning rate of the estimator of outcome (reward or pain) prediction error (for model-free 
reliability), the amplitude of transition rate function from model-based to model-free, the amplitude of transition rate from model-free to model-
based, inverse softmax temperature and the learning rate. The learning rate of the outcome prediction error estimator was larger in pain-based task 
than that in reward-based task (p = 0.009).
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emulate instrumental avoidance in most naturalistic situations 
(Bolles, 1970; Bolles and Fanselow, 1980).
While acknowledging the limitations of a single study with 
a modest sample size and biased gender distribution, the fact 
that all-but-one of the parameters is so similar across both 
reward and avoidance would seem to better support the exist-
ence of a common control architecture, but it also places the 
spotlight on the difference in the uncertainty update parameter. 
Here, we see that a difference exists in which system is judged 
to be more suitable. More specifically, the rate at which the 
model-free reliability is updated is greater in pain as opposed to 
reward. This renders the evaluation of model-free reliability 
more sensitive to short-term changes, meaning, for instance, 
that an unexpected sequence of large prediction errors will 
cause a more rapid transition to a model-based controller. With 
this in mind, it is likely that in some situations such enhanced 
dynamism may be sub-optimal. In particular, in the face of high 
uncertainty in the flexible control condition, the best strategy is 
in fact to stick with a model-free controller and ‘ride out’ the 
uncertainty, a fact that arises because the underlying state-tran-
sition probabilities are fixed (i.e. not-changing) in this task. 
However, switching more frequently to a model-based control-
ler in the pain condition is likely to lead to behavioural changes 
that are not actually necessary; indeed it is likely to lead to 
switches early in uncertain blocks, leading to a greater propor-
tion of suboptimal choices given the relatively short block 
afford little opportunity to find the correct behaviour. Therefore, 
it is likely that the sub-optimality we see in the data during 
avoidance relates to the different tuning of this reliability learn-
ing parameter. However, this somewhat counterintuitive behav-
iour should be further explored in future experiments and 
simulations. Also, an important caveat here is to note that the 
reward data comes from a scanner-based version of the task 
performed in a separate lab. Therefore, we cannot rule out the 
fact that contextual effects, such as that related to less anxiety in 
performing the task at a desk, do have the potential to confound 
any specific parameter. For this reason, the result should be cau-
tiously interpreted and considered provisional in the absence of 
a within-experiment/subject contrast.
Finally, the data may have implications for our understanding 
of psychiatric disease, in particular OCD. It has been proposed 
that OCD might result from an excessive dominance of model-
free avoidance – that is, avoidance habitisation (Robbins et al., 
2012). In this framework, avoidance actions that may have at one 
time been ‘rational’ become ‘over-habitised’, because of sub-
jects’ inability to transition back to a model-based controller that 
can explore the absence of punishment with different actions. 
Evidence for this comes from several experiments showing a 
resistance to extinction and devaluation in OCD patients in tasks 
inspired by a two-controller framework. OCD patients display 
reward-based equivalent behaviours (e.g. addictive behaviours) 
as well (Gillan et al., 2011), but there is currently no investigation 
that has directly compared excessive habit formation on avoid-
ance and addictive behaviours in a systematic way. The typical 
compulsions in OCD are avoidant rather than appetitive, suggest-
ing some independence of the mechanisms of reward and avoid-
ance arbitration. Consequently, tasks such as the one presented 
here may offer a potentially useful future experimental approach 
for understanding distinct mechanisms of pathological behav-
iour: both to gain insight into OCD and as a general illustration of 
the value of the emerging field of computational psychiatry 
(Montague et al., 2012).
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